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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OKLAHOMA'S
PROHIBITION ON LIQUOR ADVERTISING
I. INTRODUCTION*
The twenty-first amendment to the United States Constitution re-
pealed national prohibition as provided under the eighteenth amend-
ment and allocated the power to regulate the "transportation or
importation" of intoxicating liquors to the states. Under this authority,
a state may absolutely forbid the use or sale' of liquor within its juris-
diction or enact reasonable measures to control that commodity. 2
In Oklahoma, legislative enactments control all phases of the li-
quor industry, from importation and distribution, to sale and consump-
tion of alcoholic beverages.3 Enforcement of these regulations is
delegated to a state policing agency, the Olahoma Alcoholic Beverage
Control Board.4 This agency is also empowered to adopt reasonable
* The author would like to thank Professor Donald H. Gjerdingen for suggesting the topic
and his encouragement throughout the completion of the paper.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI:
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United
States is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession
of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
law thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several states, as provided in the
Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the states by
the Congress.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 300 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring): "[A] state may enact any barrier it pleases to the entry of intoxicating liquors. Its
barrier may be low, high, or insurmountable."
3. See Adolph Coors Co. v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Bev. Control Bd., 584 P.2d 717 (Okla.
1978) (upholding Oklahoma's liquor distribution scheme from due process and commerce clause
challenges). OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 501-575 (1971) (enacted as the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act). See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 163.1-244 (1971) which contain earlier legislative
provisions for the regulation of intoxicating liquors although portions which conflict with the Al-
coholic Beverage Control Act are repealed by § 501.
4. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 507 (1971). The powers and duties of the Board are described here.
Id. § 514. It is delegated the responsibility for the supervision and inspection of liquor businesses;
issue, suspension, and revocation of liquor licenses; promulgation of rules and standards; conduct
1
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police regulations beyond the extensive statutory mandates concerning
liquor.' One example is the Board's power to regulate the signs of es-
tablishments adjacent to liquor stores.6 A few of these provisions have
been the subject of increasing public controversy. A frequent criticism
of the ABC Board concerns its selective enforcement of state liquor
laws. 7 Another particularly volatile issue is Oklahoma's proscription of
liquor-by-the-drink. Preferring the private club concept of sale and
consumption,8 Oklahoma is currently the only state in the nation to
forbid the sale of liquor-by-the-drink. A recent referendum campaign
in favor of liquor-by-the-drink has sparked heated debate concerning
the entire subject of alcoholic beverages. 9
Although Oklahoma's prohibition of liquor advertising is less
newsworthy than the "liquor-by-the-drink" issue, it involves constitu-
tional questions previously unaddressed by the courts of this state. The
Oklahoma Constitution provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any
person, firm or corporation to advertise the sale of alcoholic beverage
within the State of Oklahoma except one sign at the retail outlet bear-
ing the words 'Retail Alcoholic Liquor Store.' '"10 Additionally,
Oklahoma statutes provide that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to ad-
vertise any alcoholic beverages or the sale of same within the
State of Oklahoma except one sign at the retail outlet bearing
the words "Retail Alcoholic Liquor Store" or any combina-
tion of such words or any of them and no letter in any such
of hearings concerning liquor violations; compilation of informational statistics; and the enforce-
ment of intoxicating liquor rules, regulations and statutes.
5. Id. This comment uses the words liquor, alcoholic beverages, intoxicating beverages, and
alcohol interchangeably. These categories include all such intoxicants containing more than 3.2%
alcohol by weight. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 163.1 (1971) (intoxicating beverages). See also id.
§ 506(l), (2), (3).
6. Oklahoma Alcoholic Bev. Control Bd. v. Burris, 612 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1980).
7. Scott, Liquor and the Law: Last Call, OKLAHOMA MONTHLY, May, 1981, at 47-53.
8. OKLA. CoNsT. art. XXVII, § 4 forbids the operation of an "open saloon." This is defined
as "any place, public or private, wherein alcoholic beverage is sold or offered for sale, by the
drink; or, sold, offered for sale, or kept for sale for consumption on the premises."
This does not prohibit one from taking his own bottle to a private place and having drinks
therefrom or paying to have a drink mixed. However, the drink must be from his own bottle, and
his bottle may not become commingled with other bottles so as to lose its personal identification.
Barnes v. State ex rel. Wolf, 383 P.2d 635 (Okla. 1963). Likewise, separate bottles for each mem-
ber of the party are required and "house bottles" are forbidden.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 505 (1971) provides in part: "[N]othing herein shall prevent the posses-
sion and transportation of alcoholic beverages for personal use of the possessor, his family, and
guests .... "
9. See generally Scott, supra note 7, at 47 (data from earlier, unsuccessful liquor-by-the-
drink campaigns, present enforcement controversies and policy arguments on both sides).
10. OKLA. CONsT. art. XXVII, § 5, cL 5.
1981]
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 16 [1980], Iss. 4, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss4/5
TULSA LAW JO URAAL [Vol. 16:734
sign shall b6 more than four (4) inches in height or more than
three (3) inches in width, and if more than one (1) line is used
the lines shall not be more than one (1) inch apart."t
The liquor advertising ban effectively silences all commercial ad-
vertising of liquor by the Oklahoma media except for the one sign al-
loted each liquor store. Note that newspapers and magazines
published outside the state and intended for nationwide distribution,
but which are sold in Oklahoma, are not prohibited from including
alcoholic beverage advertising. 2 Similarly, a newspaper printed and
published in Oklahoma, but not circulated in the state, is not subject to
the advertising proscription. However, an Oklahoma publication
which circulates both inside and outside the state may not advertise
liquor pursuant to Oklahoma law.13  National television and radio
broadcasts relayed through state affiliates must have liquor commer-
cials blocked out by the local stations in order to conform to state law.
If the commercial is broadcast to Oklahoma viewers, the liquor manu-
facturer who purchased the national advertising space must show that
it took reasonable efforts to have the commercial preempted in
Oklahoma."
Retailers, wholesalers, distributors, and manufacturers of alcoholic
beverages are all subject to the statutory proscriptions. After issuing
11. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 516 (1971). The prohibition of the advertising of alcoholic bever-
ages in § 516 covers instances not prohibited by the constitutional ban on advertising the sale of
alcoholic beverages. 11 Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 453, 454 (1976) defines "advertise" as: "to give
notice of," "to announce publicly," or "to make known." In Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. (65-362) (1965),
the Attorney General stated that an advertisement including recipes for mixed drinks would be
prohibited even though it did not refer to the sale of such beverages. The standard for determin-
ing the violation of § 516 then, is whether an advertisement tends to promote the consumption of
alcoholic beverages. This comment will treat the statutory and constitutional provisions together,
as a total prohibition of advertising alcoholic beverages, beyond the narrow exception of the "Re-
tail Alcoholic Liquor Store" sign.
Mississippi also entirely prohibits liquor advertisements within that state. Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 67-1-85, 97-31-1 (1972).
12. 9 Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 418, 419-20 (1976) explains: "Article XXVII, Section 5 of the
Oklahoma Constitution, and 37 O.S. 1971, § 516 do not prohibit liquor advertising in a magazine
and/or program published and printed outside the State of Oklahoma by a publisher headquar-
tered outside the State of Oklahoma, and to be distributed in all fifty states. .. ."
13. 1 Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. 28, 30-31 (1968) states: "[A] newspaper published in Oklahoma
which may have circulation both inside and outside the state may not accept advertisements of
alcoholic beverages although ... an Oklahoma publisher may accept alcoholic beverage adver-
tisements for newspaper issues not circulated within Oklahoma."
14. Oklahoma Alcoholic Bev. Control Bd. v. Heublein Wines, Int'l, 566 P.2d 1158, 1160
(Okla. 1977). In this case, the license of a liquor manufacturer was not revoked since there was no
evidence of intentional or willful telecast of wine commercials. The court also found Heublein to
have prudently taken action to assure compliance with Oklahoma advertising proscriptions. Id. at
1161.
3
Long: The Constitutionality of Oklahoma's Prohibition on Liquor Adverti
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1980
OKLHOM4 LIQUOR ADVERTISING
warnings of the illegality of any liquor advertisement, the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board may take action against the advertiser by re-
voking the license to sell that commodity' 5 or imposing a fine, misde-
meanor jail sentence, or both. 16
Advertising restrictions are generally classified as being within the
expanded state police powers attributable to the twenty-first amend-
ment. Although the constitutionality of Oklahoma's advertising pro-
scription was upheld by the state supreme court as early as 1909,17 cases
have continued to challenge similar advertising limitations in other
states as violative of the United States Constitution. 8 In 1977, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the regulations do not cause an
undue burden on interstate commerce in light of expanded state au-
thority under the twenty-first amendment. 9 In 1980, that same court
upheld state liquor advertising regulations when subjected to a first
amendment challenge. 20 Generally, Oklahoma has favored state regu-
15. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 528(1) (1971) states: "Any license issued hereunder shall, by order
of the Board, after due notice and hearing: (a) be revoked, or suspended for such period as the
Board deems appropriate, if the Board finds that the licensee has wilfully violated any of the
provisions of this Act .. "
In Oklahoma Alcoholic Bev. Control Bd. v. Heublein Wines, Int'l, 566 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Okla.
1977) the court held that § 528(1) was the applicable penalty provision rather than § 524(c) which
imposed a "strict liability" standard. See Note, Application of the Twen'-frstAmendment to Inter-
state Alcoholic Beverage Advertising, 3 OKLA. CrrY U.L. REV. 102, 103-04 (1978).
16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 566 (1971) sets out the general penalty provision for violation of the
various liquor regulations:
Any person who shall violate any provision of this Act for which no specific penalty
is prescribed shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and be fined not more than Five Hundred
Dollars ($500.00), or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than six (6) months, or
both such fine and imprisonment.
17. State ex rel West v. State Capitol Co., 24 Okla. 252, 103 P. 1021 (1909) (upholding an
early state prohibition of liquor advertising on the basis of state power under the Wilson Act of
1890).
18. Eg., Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 13 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Cal.
1935) (upholding a statute regulating the size and location of alcohol signs on premises serving
liquor on the basis of the twenty-first amendment); Advertiser Co. v. State, 193 Ala. 418, 69 So.
501 (1915) (upholding total ban on liquor advertising from claim based on the contract clause);
State v. Delaye, 193 Ala. 500, 68 So. 993 (1915) (dismissing a commerce clause challenge to liquor
advertising prohibition statute); Commonwealth v. Anheiser-Busch, 181 Va. 678, 26 S.E.2d 94
(1943) (sustaining state agency's power to restrict liquor advertising on police power of state).
19. Oklahoma Alcoholic Bev. Control Bd. v. Heublein Wines, Int'l, 566 P.2d 1158, 1162-63
(Okla. 1977) held: "Although television stations are engaged in interstate commerce and
Oklahoma laws prohibiting advertising the sale of alcoholic beverages [via television] have un-
questionably imposed a restraint upon that commerce, these facts alone do not justify a holding
they impose a constitutionally impermissible burden on interstate commerce."
20. Oklahoma Alcoholic Bev. Control Bd. v. Burris, 612 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1980). The court
upheld a regulation of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board restricting the signs which may be
placed on or near premises adjacent to retail liquor stores. Addressing the first amendment chal-
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latory powers under the twenty-first amendment over constitutional ob-
jections derived from other provisions to the point of implying limitless
state control over all liquor issues.
A constitutional challenge to Oklahoma's restriction of liquor ad-
vertising currently takes on a new dimension in light of the United
States Supreme Court's expansion of first amendment protection to the
area of commercial speech. There is no disputing the power of any
state to absolutely forbid the importation of alcohol within state juris-
dictional boundaries.E' However, once the sale of alcohol is allowed,
the state's ability to regulate the advertising of that commodity be-
comes increasingly questionable as restrictions must be reasonable in
light of federal constitutional requirements. This comment addresses
two issues: The extent to which advertising of alcoholic beverages is
entitled to first amendment protection; and whether the expansion of
state police powers under the twenty-first amendment permits
Oklahoma's prohibition o*f this protected speech. First, the police pow-
ers of the state as granted by the twenty-first amendment will be con-
sidered as well as the restraints courts have imposed on those powers.
Of particular interest is the questionable ability of the state to infringe
on first amendment freedom of speech in furtherance of liquor regula-
tions. Second, the validity of any distinction between commercial and
fully-protected forms of speech will be scrutinized in light of the theo-
retical underpinnings of the first amendment. Third, the nature of the
speech will be examined to determine which types of advertisements
are entitled to first amendment protection. Finally, the constitutional
status of particular liquor advertisements will be discussed, applying
the commercial speech decisions announced in the 1980 Term of the
Supreme Court. z
Historically, however, a state has greater powers to regulate speech in the form of
commercial advertisement than any other form .... This, coupled with the broad grant
of power vested in the states by the twenty-first amendment, leaves no doubt (that the)
Board has the power to allow advertisement or forbid it entirely if it concerns the sale of
alcohol.
Id. at 259 (footnote omitted).
Original publication of this case in the advance sheets of the unofficial reporter was with-
drawn by the Oklahoma Supreme Court before publication of the final edition of volume 612 of
the Pacific Reporter Second Series.
21. U.S. CorsT. amend. XXI, § 2 set forth in note I supra.
22. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Consol-
idated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
[Vol. 16:734
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II. STATE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE LIQUOR UNDER THE
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
In 1919, responding to public outcry over liquor violations in dry
states, state legislatures ratified the eighteenth amendment and national
prohibition.23 However, after fourteen years of difficult implementa-
tion, the eighteenth amendment was repealed by section one of the
twenty-first amendment24 while the power to control liquor regulation
was explained in section two: "The transportation or importation into
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited."25 From the language of this provision, it is unclear
whether state power to control alcohol is limited solely to the transpor-
tation and importation aspects of commerce or whether it extends be-
yond these areas to all measures affecting the commodity. More
importantly, the degree of exclusive power allowed to the states free of
federal constraint is uncertain.26 The precise proportion of delegated
powers under the .mbiguous wording of section two is the main issue
of most state liquor cases.
The United States Supreme Court has examined the various inter-
pretations of section two many times since the ratification of the
twenty-first amendment. The choices include absolute state power,
concurrent state and federal power, and a middle course between both
extremes. Early cases followed the absolutist position of deference to
state liquor control.27 This sentiment is generally supported by exami-
nation of prior national liquor enactments28 as well as reference to con-
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (1919)(repealed U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (1933)) states:
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exporta-
tion thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for
beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Section 2. The Congress ani the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amend-
ment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the
Constitution, within seven years from the date of submission hereof to the States of the
Congress.
Congress enacted the Volstead Act, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 49 Stat. 872 (1935)), as the en-
forcement measure of the eighteenth amendment.
24. U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI.
25. Id. § 2.
26. Discussing the growth and limitations on this power, see notes 32-104 infra and accompa-
nying text.
27. See, eg., State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market, 299 U.S. 59 (1936); see cases listed
in note 40 infra and accompanying text.
28. The Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1976)(originally enacted as Act of Aug. 8, 1890, ch. 728,
1981]
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gressional hearings and Senate floor debates concerning the twenty-first
amendment.z9 The broad grant of state authority indicated by early
opinions was severely curtailed by later cases which limited state power
in particular areas traditionally occupied by federal authority.3" In or-
der to appreciate the shifting from seemingly limitless state power
trends of the court to more federal intrusion in the area, some cases will
be examined according to the various constitutional areas affected.31
Objections under the commerce clause involve four additional types of
federal challenges to extended state authority in that same general area.
These challenges include matters concerning imports and exports, fed-
eral enclaves, shipment of liquor through states, and antitrust viola-
tions. Likewise, the fourteenth amendment discussion will explore due
process and equal protection challenges to state liquor regulations.
This brief inquiry into the extent of state powers under the twenty-first
amendment is intended to ascertain the effect state reguatory measures
may have on the Bill of Rights. Finally, the first amendment cases will
26 Stat. 313) expanded traditional state police powers by allowing the regulation of interstate
liquor shipments after reaching the state of their ultimate destination. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S.
412 (1898). However the commerce clause still operated to prohibit more extensive interstate
regulatory measures. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897). To further increase state powers, in
1913 Congress enacted the Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1976) (originally enacted as Act
of Mar. 1, 1913, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699) which exempted state liquor regulations governing shipment
and transportation from the ordinary operation of the commerce clause. Clark Distilling Co. v.
Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917). A pertinent part of the Act reads: "The shipment or
transportation... of any... intoxicating liquor. . . from one State. . .into any other State
...which... is intended.., to be received.., or in any manner used,.. . in violation of any
law of such State. . .is hereby prohibited."
29. See 76 CONG. REc. 64-4172 (1933). Senator Wagner, a sponsor of the amendment, advo-
cated total state control over alcohol in belief that local responsibility for "liquor problems" was
most effective. Id. at 4144. Advocating a similar position was Senator Blaine, the Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee which authored the amendment: "This proposal is restoring to
the states, in effect, the right to regulate commerce respecting a single commodity . . . namely,
intoxicating liquor." Id. at 4141.
Supporting state power in alcohol regulation, the Senate rejected an amendment proposing
concurrent power between federal and state governments in that area, adopting instead, the pres-
ent language of § 2.
Though any attempt to ascertain legislative intent is by the nature of the body, futile, and
contrary opinions were certainly manifested, 76 CONG. REc. 4168 (1933), it would seem that § 2 of
the twenty-first amendment was intended to return to the states the police powers to regulate
alcoholic beverages in a manner which would ordinarily be forbidden by the commerce clause.
For a detailed examination of the state conventions ratifying the twenty-first amendment, see
E. BROWN, RATIFICATION OF THE TwENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1970).
30. See notes 48-104 infra and accompanying text.
31. See generally Lydick, State Control ofLiquorAdpertising under the United States Constitu-
tion, 12 BAYLOR L. REv. 43 (1960); Note, The Effect of the Twenty-First Amendment on State
Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1578 (1975); Note, Retail Price
Maintenancefor Liquor: Does the Twent-FirstAmendment Preclude a Free Trade Market? 5 HAs-
TINGs CoNsT. L.Q. 507 (1978).
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be examined to determine whether the twenty-first amendment allows
state infringement on commercial speech afforded first amendment
protection.
A. Commerce Clause
Early Supreme Court cases appeared to grant virtually limitless
power to the state in regulating liquor. Most of the first cases challeng-
ing these regulatory measures were based on violations of the com-
merce clause.32 State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co. 33
concerned a California wholesalers' challenge to that state's $500 fee
for wholesale beer importers to which domestic wholesalers were not
subject. The California importation fee was disputed as violating both
the commerce clause and the equal protection clause of the constitu-
tion. The three-judge federal district court found for the liquor whole-
salers.34
Reversing the decision of the lower court, Justice Brandeis relied
heavily on the twenty-first amendment to sustain the importation tax
from both constitutional challenges. Emphasizing that prior to the rati-
fication of the twenty-first amendment, such a tax would have violated
the commerce clause,35 the Court held that the amendment had given
the states broad powers to regulate alcoholic beverages without violat-
ing the commerce clause. Addressing the equal protection issue, Justice
Brandeis flatly declared: "A classification recognized by the Twenty-
First Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth.
36
The court nevertheless explained that the California taxation scheme
rested on "conditions requiring difference of treatment," 37 thereby im-
plying that a rational basis existed for the classification. Despite the
harsh dismissal of the fourteenth amendment classification indicated
by the quotation, Justice Brandeis specifically stated that the Court was
not declaring that the twenty-first amendment freed state regulations
from all other constitutional restrictions on its police power.38 The de-
32. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3: "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
33. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
34. 12 F. Supp. 140, 142 (S.D. Cal. 1935). The lower court discussed the twenty-first amend-
ment issue only briefly.
35. 299 U.S. at 62.
36. Id. at 64.
37. Id.
38. Id. Responding to the plaintiffs' contention that to sustain the California tax would pro-
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cision was limited solely to interpreting the twenty-first amendment as
conferring upon the state the power to dictate the conditions of liquor
importation.39
Despite the limitations imposed on states' power by the Young's
Market opinion, that holding was greatly expanded in subsequent deci-
sions over unsuccessful federal commerce clause objections.40 Uphold-
ing far more restrictive state statutes than that considered in Young's
Market, the later decisions nevertheless relied on that opinion in grant-
ing broad regulatory authority to the states. The court summarized the
expansive absolutist reasoning of these holdings: "[T]he right of a state
to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not lim-
ited by the commerce clause."'"
Following the Young's Market approach, a 1966 case, Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter,42 held that a New York price fixing
statute was not invalidated by the commerce clause. Even though such
a sweeping regulatory measure might not have been protected by the
enhanced police powers of the state, the court weighed the state's goal
of protecting in-state customers from price discrimination and the con-
commitant disadvantage of higher prices against the burden on the
commerce clause to allow this rational regulatory measure to stand.43
Emphasizing that the twenty-first amendment had not totally repealed
the commerce clause, Seagram nevertheless indicated that a state is to
be accorded wide latitude as to its choice of means in pursuit of a per-
missible end.'
From these cases it seems an accurate observation that "the regu-
lation of the liquor traffic is one of the oldest and more untrammeled of
legislative powers." 45 Despite the sweeping language of the decisions
discussed above, the regulatory measures they involve have been dis-
39. Id. at 62.
40. Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939) (sustaining a statute prohibiting
liquor importation from states which discriminated against local alcohol); Indianapolis Brewing
Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939)(upholding a retaliatory statute similar to that
in McKiltrick); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp, 304 U.S. 401 (1938) (upholding a statute forbid-
ding alcohol importation without a registered trade name). But see Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308
U.S. 132, 139 (1939) (upholding Kentucky liquor regulations on the grounds of state police powers
rather than heightened authority under the twenty-first amendment).
41. 305 U.S. at 394. (emphasis added).
42. 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
43. Id. at 42-43.
44. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 116 (1972) (citing Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 48 (1966)).
45. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464,465-66 (1948). This case was subsequently overruled by
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976).
[Vol. 16:734
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tinguished as exceptions to the commerce clause by the twenty-first
amendment rather than exemptions from all federal constitutional con-
straints.46 The seemingly broad grant of state authority implicit in the
early decisions is steadily reduced by the later assertion of federal
power in areas of particular national concern. No longer does the gen-
eral state interest in alcoholic beverages outweigh the concentrated fed-
eral interest in specific national issues.4' Claims of absolute state
power quickly diminish in the face of increased federal controls in
cases involving imports and exports, federal enclaves, shipments
through states, and antitrust violations. The expansive holdings of the
early cases are sharply narrowed by curtailed applications of state au-
thority in specialized areas.
1. Import-Export
The power to legislate concerning imports and exports is one con-
stitutionally allocated to the national government.48 In Department of
Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co. , the court addressed a con-
flict between the import-export clause and the twenty-first amend-
ment.50 Kentucky sought to tax liquor which Beam had imported from
Scotland into warehouses in that state for distribution in the United
States. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held for the importer.5' Af-
firming the Kentucky court's decision, the United States Supreme
Court explained the effect of the twenty-first amendment on the im-
46. Id. at 206-17; see United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 300 (1945) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring):
Before that Amendment. . . alcohol was for constitutional purposes treated in the ab-
stract as an article of commerce just like peanuts and potatoes ... The Twenty-First
Amendment reversed this legal situation by subordinating rights under the Commerce
Clause to the power of a State to control, and to control effectively, the traffic in liquor
within its borders.
But see California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972): "[T]he broad sweep of the Twenty-First
Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more than the normal state authority
over public health, welfare, and morals." Id. at 114-15.
47. See discussion infra notes 52-76 and accompanying text.
48. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 2: "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for execut-
ing its Inspection Laws .... "
49. 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
50. This issue was raised earlier in William Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171
(1939) (per curiam). Upholding a federal statute controlling the labelling of imported liquor, the
Court dismissed the importer's argument that total state control granted by the twenty-first
amendment prevented any federal interference by flatly stating that "we see no substance in this
contention." Id. at 173. The opinion deals primarily with jurisdictional inadequacy, id. at 172-
75, however, and left the issue partially unresolved until the Beam decision.
51. 367 S.W.2d 267 (Ky. 1963).
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port-export clause. Distinguishing between the general authority
granted to the states by the twenty-first amendment and the flat prohi-
bition of state duties by the import-export clause,52 Justice Stewart's
opinion clearly favored the particular prohibition over the general
power of the states.
To sustain the tax which Kentucky has imposed in this case
would require nothing short of squarely holding that the
Twenty-First Amendment has completely repealed the Ex-
port-Import Clause so far as intoxicants are concerned. Noth-
ing in the language of the Amendment nor in its history leads
to such an extraordinary conclusion.53
Although Justice Stewart's distinction does not account for the reason-
ing behind the subordination of the commerce clause to the twenty-first
amendment, in light of the superiority of the import-export clause,54
the decision clearly marks an inroad into the breadth of state power
concerning liquor. The untrammelled power of the states declared in
earlier opinions began to develop federal limitations despite broad
commerce clause exceptions.
2. Federal Enclaves
State liquor regulations have been sharply narrowed by limiting
state power under the twenty-first amendment to the territorial jurisdic-
tion of that entity. This distinction becomes particularly important
where distinct areas within state boundaries are subject to varying
quantities of federal jurisdiction by some prior agreement between
state and federal governments.55
In an early enclave case involving the transportation of alcohol
from outside the state into a national park within state borders5 6 the
52. 377 U.S. at 344.
53. Id. at 345-46 (footnotes omitted). The Court stated the warehoused liquor would not be
subjected to state taxation until it was introduced into local commerce. Id.
54. The different treatment given interstate commerce and foreign commerce is seemingly
illogical as it conforms to neither the text nor history of the Amendment, nor its espoused policy to
protect dry states from the imposition of unwanted liquor shipments. Also, the language of the
commerce clause includes foreign as well as domestic imports. Note, The Effect ofthe Twenty-First
Amendment on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 COLJM. L. REV. 1578, 1584-85
(1975); see Department of Revenue v. James Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341,348 (1964) (Black,
J., dissenting) (legislative history). But see note 28 supra. If the effect of the twenty-first amend-
ment was intended to be limited by the Webb-Kenyon Act, the Beam distinction between the
commerce clause and import-export clause may be viable.
55. A federal enclave may be established through the operation of U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl.
17 (cession of State property for federal governmental needs) or art. IV, § 3, el. 2 (national govern-
ment retains certain parcels of land within the state when it grants a state territorial boundaries).
56. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938). California sought to impose
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Court reasoned that the requirement of transportation into the state
"for delivery or use therein" was not met since the destination of the
liquor shipment was not within state territorial jurisdiction.57  The
Court further explained, "Where exclusive jurisdiction is in the United
States, without power in the State to regulate alcoholic beverages, the
XXI Amendment is not applicable. ' 58  Equating the twenty-first
amendment with territorial jurisdiction, state authority under that pro-
vision can be defeated even within geographical state boundaries. This
approach of strict jurisdictional limitation has been followed and ex-
panded by subsequent cases.59 The Court has liberally construed state
statutes regulating shipments "into the state" in the same manner that
it interpreted the identical phrase in section two.60 By restricting the
power to act in furtherance of the twenty-first amendment with princi-
ples of territorial jurisdiction, shipments into an area within the state
under exclusive federal jurisdiction are not subject to full state liquor
regulations.
The federal enclave cases illustrate further that liquor control
granted to the states is neither exclusive nor insurmountable. Rather,
the territorial jurisdictions of each government seem to determine the
limits of authority each may exert over alcoholic beverages shipped to
or from the enclave.6"
3. Shipments Through a State
State statutes which unduly burden the shipment of goods through
a state are normally held unconstitutional under the commerce
clause.62 In the case of alcoholic beverages, the commerce clause has
been liberally interpreted to allow the reasonable exercise of police
the same importation fee as in Young's Market on carriers importing alcohol into Yosemite Na-
tional Park.
57. Id. at 538.
58. Id.
59. Eg., United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363 (1973) (exempting military
bases under exclusive federal jurisdiction from a state marketing restriction even though liquor
consumption was not limited to the enclave).
60. Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 387 (1944) (interpreting the language
of OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 41 (1941)(repealed 1947) to avoid addressing the constitutional issues
raised by the statute.)
61. "[Aibsent an appropriate express reservation-which is lacking here-the Twenty-First
Amendment confers no power on a State to regulate-whether by licensing, taxation, or other-
wise---the importation of distilled spirits into the territory over which the United States exercises
exclusive jurisdiction." United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363, 375 (1972); see
Note, The Effect of the Twenty-First Amendment on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors,
75 COLUM. L. Rav. 1578, 1589 (1975).
62. E.g., Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964); Lemke v.
1981]
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powers by the state with regard to liquor being shipped through it for a
destination beyond state borders. Without mentioning the twenty-first
amendment, early cases relied solely on traditional police powers6 to
uphold reasonable state liquor regulations for through shipments.6 4 In
a later opinion, the Court explained that a state may regulate through
shipments in a reasonable manner to prevent any unlawful in-state di-
version of the commodity.65 The regulatory measures involved in that
case were far more stringent than those previously considered. How-
ever, without utilizing the additional authority granted by the twenty-
first amendment, the Court held that the commerce clause was not vio-
lated by the state regulations in furtherance of its police power.6 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter stated that even though he
found the state regulations to violate the commerce clause, the twenty-
first amendment authorized such circumvention of that federal
power.67 He reasoned: "[Hiaving the power to prohibit liquor from
coming into a State, a State may take measures against frustration of
that power by resort to the claim that liquor passing through a State
enjoys the protection of the Commerce Clause. ' 68
4. Antitrust
Under the Sherman Antitrust Act,69 the statutory proscriptions of
collusive price-fixing have been applied to alcoholic beverages as well
as normal commodities. In 1945, the Court held that a multi-state
price-fixing scheme involving retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers
was not insulated from federal operation of the Sherman Act due to
state power granted by the twenty-first amendment.7"
In a 1980 case, California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mideal
Aluminum, Inc. ,71 the Court held that the twenty-first amendment did
not prevent the operation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, even though
Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922); Texas & N.O. Ry. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U.S. 111
(1913); Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
63. E.g., Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941) (upheld a statute requiring the acquisi-
tion of a permit for a nominal fee before transporting alcohol through the state).
64. Id. at 396.
65. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944).
66. Id. at 137.
67. Id. at 140 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 142.
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
70. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
71. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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the Act was adopted under the commerce power of Congress.7 2 Deliv-
ering the majority opinion, Justice Powell traced the judicial history of
state regulatory power under the amendment but concluded that con-
stitutional interests of the federal government, particularly the com-
merce clause, are not abolished in the face of state liquor regulations.73
These decisions demonstrate that there is no bright line
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twenty-
first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regula-
tions, those controls may be subject to the federal commerce
power in appropriate situations. The competing state and
federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scrutiny
of those concerns in a "concrete case."74
The Court then concluded that the federal interest in a competitive
economy outweighed the unsubstantiated state interest in promoting
temperance and the protection of small retailers through resale price
maintenance."
Even though earlier cases showed twenty-first amendment superi-
ority to federal commerce clause interests, a statutory scheme derived
from that subordinated provision was not powerless in the liquor regu-
lation area. Dissenting in an earlier case, Justice Black summarized the
relationship between state and federal governments in antitrust mat-
ters:
72. Id. at 108-10, 114.
73. Id. at 108-09.
74. Id. at 110 (citing Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332
(1964)); see Epstein v. Lordi, 261 F. Supp. 921 (D.N.J. 1966) afdper cur/am, 389 U.S. 29 (1967)
which states:
The Federal scheme does not preempt all State regulation merely because commerce is
affected. This possibility was implicitly rejected in Hostelter. Nor is there an explicit
conflict between the direction of the Federal and State statutes as such. Rather, the
significance of the Federal scheme lies in the fact that it delineates both the local and
national interests which must be weighed in assessing the "reasonable necessity" of the
burden imposed by the wholesale license requirement. In other words, the Court must
determine whether the burden imposed on foreign commerce, and on the national inter-
est therein, is justified by "the character of the local interests and the available means of
protecting them."
Id. at 936-37.
75. 377 U.S. at 113-14. The Court noted the unconvincing statistics cited in support of the
resale price maintenance regulations. Citing the state supreme court, Justice Powell agreed that
the small correlation between price-fixing policies and per capita liquor consumption revealed by
studies "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the justification for such laws on the ground that
they promote temperance." Id. at 112.
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Granting the state's full authority to determine the conditions
upon which liquor can come into its territory and what will be
done with it after it gets there, it does not follow from that
fact, that the United States is wholly without power to regu-
late the conduct of those who engage in interstate trade
outside the jurisdiction of the state ... 76
B. The Fourteenth Amendment
Decisions interpreting the relationship between the fourteenth and
the first amendment are particularly important in determining the con-
stitutionality of Oklahoma's liquor advertising prohibitions since it is
through the fourteenth amendment that the first amendment is applied
to the states." Increased judicial deference to both the due process and
equal protection clauses in liquor cases is favorable to any first amend-
ment challenge to a liquor regulation.
1. Due Process
The constitutional guarantee of due process provides that "No
state shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." ' The precise constitutional requirements of due
process have been explored in a series of cases in the procedural due
process area.79
The sweeping language of early twenty-first amendment cases
seemed to signal that due process was not a bar to any state regulatory
measure concerning liquor. In some cases the Court disposed of the
due process statutory challenge entirely without discussion of the is-
sue.8 ° But the limits more recently imposed on state liquor authority
signal an increase of constitutional power in due process challenges to
state liquor regulations.
One recent case8' involved a due process objection to a statute al-
lowing the public posting of the names of persons determined by public
officials to be excessive drinkers and forbidding the sale of liquor to
any of those named. No hearing or notice was given before the public
76. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 299 (1945).
77. Eg., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
79. See e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (prejudgment replevin); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare payments); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment).
80. Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939).
81. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
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posting. The federal district court ruled that the statute unconstitution-
ally violated the named person's right to due process. 82 Affirming the
decision of the lower court, the Supreme Court held that although the
twenty-first amendment had greatly increased state police power in the
area of alcoholic beverage regulation, it had not empowered the state to
arbitrarily infringe on the rights of individuals. The opinion implies
that a narrow reading of the twenty-first amendment is appropriate in
confrontations with individual liberties: "It is significant that most of
the provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural, for it is procedure
that marks much of the difference between rule by law and rule by
fiat.",83
Other lower court opinions have expanded the constitutional deci-
sion by narrowing the breadth of state power.84 It appears that the
trend toward increasing limitations on state liquor regulations has fa-
vorably affected due process claims in that area.85
2. Equal Protection
Consistent with due process decisions, early Supreme Court cases
involving liquor regulation dismissed equal protection claims of arbi-
trary classifications with little or no comment,8 6 implying that the four-
teenth amendment would not restrain an otherwise valid state exercise
of its police power. Although portions of the opinion read otherwise,87
the Court may have been using a rational basis, lower-tiered approach
in reviewing the regulations, having silently weighed and rejected equal
protection interests.88
82. Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
83. 400 U.S. at 436.
84. Misurelli v. City of Racine, 346 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (imposing stricter due pro-
cess standards for liquor license refusal), vacated sub non. on other grounds City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1972) (jurisdiction).
85. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 207 n.21 (1976).
86. E.g., Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939); Maho-
ney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938); State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market, 299
U.S. 59 (1936).
87. "A classification recognized by the Twenty-First Amendment cannot be deemed forbid-
den by the Fourteenth." State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market, 299 U.S. at 64. See supra
notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
88. Generally the judiciary has deferred to legislative wisdom on equal protection challenges
to classifications in areas as zoning, taxation, and economic distribution or regulation by requiring
that there be only a rational basis for the distinction (lower-tier analysis). See, e.g., Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S.
356, 365 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972). Classifications which burden
fundamental rights such as voting or prejudice "discrete and insular minorities" are upheld only
after being strictly scrutinized so that the means are very narrowly drawn to accomplish a permis-
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After the initial surge of cases supporting absolute state liquor au-
thority, equal protection challenges to state regulations began to be
scrutinized more carefully.8 9 This movement eliminated earlier specu-
lation of possible exemption for alcohol control statutes from four-
teenth amendment restrictions. Eventually, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis"9 the Court applied full scale equal protection analysis to discrim-
inatory liquor classifications although that opinion totally ignored any
twenty-first amendment considerations. 9'
In Craig v. Boren,92 the Supreme Court openly confronted the con-
flict between the equal protection clause and the fourteenth amend-
ment. Applying equal protection standards to a liquor regulation
which discriminated on the basis of sex, the Court invalidated an
Oklahoma statute which allowed women to purchase beer at the age of
eighteen but required men to have reached twenty-one. 93 Justice Bren-
nan's opinion stressed that the twenty-first amendment "primarily cre-
ated an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause"94
without rendering that clause totally inoperative in liquor matters.95
sible end (upper-tier analysis). See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938). A middle-tier approach has been adopted in cases involving gender discrimina-
tion. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 999-1003 (1978).
89. In Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948), the Court upheld a statute forbidding
female bartenders in urban areas who were not the wife or daughter of the tavern's owner. Citing
deference to legislative wisdom and applying the reasonableness requirement to measure the
equal protection issue, the majority dashed any hopes of wholesale superiority of the twenty-first
amendment in this particular area.
This decision was subsequently overruled to the extent that sex discrimination analysis for
equal protection was modified in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976).
90. 407 U.S. 163, 177-79 (1972). The case concerned an equal protection challenge by a
Black man to a local branch of a national fraternity which refused to serve him a drink. Even
though the opinion primarily involved standing and state action issues, the Court freely applied
the strict scrutiny test of equal protection.
91. Id But see United States v. Cantrell, 307 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. La. 1969) (invalidating a
racially discriminatory local ordinance forbidding liquor sales to servicemen after noting that the
twenty-first amendment presented no obstacle to a fourteenth amendment challenge).
92. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
93. Id. at 210. The decision held unconstitutional the interaction of OKLA. STAT. tit. 37,
§ 241 (forbidding the sale of liquor to minors) and § 245 (defining "minor" as under the age of 18
for females and under the age of 21 for males) (1971).
94. 429 U.S. at 206. The opinion traced the early historical development of§ 2 of the twenty-
first amendment, analogizing its treatment with that of the Webb-Kenyon Act. .d. at 205-06; see
discussion supra notes 28 & 54 and accompanying text.
95. 429 U.S. at 206; accord, Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324,
332 (1976) ("Both the Twenty-First Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same
Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution each must be considered in light of the
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case").
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Constitutional provisions beyond the commerce clause however, are
only vaguely affected by the twenty-first amendment.
Explicitly approving recent equal protection inroads into state au-
thority, the Court commented that the "Twenty-First Amendment does
not save the invidious gender-based discrimination from invalidation
as a denial of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment."96 The Court went beyond addressing only the
equal protection issue when it remarked that "[n]either the text nor the
history of the Twenty-First Amendment suggests that it qualifies indi-
vidual rights protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment where the sale or use of liquor is concerned. 97
C. The First Amendment
The reference to individual rights in the Craig opinion leads to the
central issue addressed by this comment: the effect of the twenty-first
amendment on forms of expression protected by the first amendment,
and particularly its effect on state power to regulate liquor advertising.
Any decision in this area rests heavily on the interpretation of the only
recent United States Supreme Court case to address this issue.98 In
California v. LaRue99 the Court upheld a state liquor regulation which
prohibited lewd sexual performances in establishments licensed by the
state to serve liquor-by-the-drink. Justice Rehnquist's opinion admit-
ted that some forms of suppressed expression were protected by the first
amendment"° since they would not be judged obscene under the Roth
test. 1 1 However, citing the need of states to preserve the health and
morality of its citizens, the Court emphasized that it was concerned
with liquor licensing and the anti-social behavior which typified the
areas surrounding establishments featuring liquor and lewd entertain-
ment. 0 2 Even though the opinion stressed that the regulations were
96. 429 U.S. at 204-05.
97. Id. at 206 (quoting P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 258
(1975)).
98. But see cases cited upholding liquor advertising restrictions before commercial speech
was given first amendment protection, supra note 18.
99. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech. .. ."
The first amendment was made applicable to the States through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment by Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
101. 409 U.S. at 116. At the time LaRue was decided, obscenity was defined by Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
102. 409 U.S. at 110-11. Hearings had been conducted to determine the causes of the unsa-
vory atmosphere and the best means by which to eliminate the evil:
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restrictive "more of gross sexuality than of communication," it was
noted that the performances were not entirely prohibited by the state-
only in licensed liquor bars. 0 3 The Court also distinguished any appli-
cability of symbolic speech protections due to the absence of a commu-
nicative element in the lewd conduct as opposed to some forms of
expressive conduct which have been equated with written or spoken
expression. 1o4
The broad grant of state power under the twenty-first amendment
is certainly not as limitless as early decisions implied. The LaRue deci-
sion should not be taken as giving the twenty-first amendment absolute
superiority over the first amendment. Certainly, that decision would be
relied on to bolster any such claim, but internal limitations to the appli-
cability of the case do exist. For instance, LaRue concerned only inci-
dental infringement of partially protected speech in furtherance of state
licensing powers. The questionable communicative value of the danc-
ing seems to have given rise to a greater toleration for limitation on its
expression. Also important is the existence of alternative forums for
performance of the dancing in establishments not serving liquor-by-
the-drink. The isolated facts of LaRue do affect first amendment rights
but do not foreclose all freedom of expression objections to the intru-
sion of twenty-first amendment regulations.
D. Application of State Police Power to Prohibit the Advertisement of
Alcoholic Beverages.
The preceding sections explained judicial interpretations of state
statutes enacted pursuant to the twenty-first amendment. Regardless of
the particular constitutional provision involved, the cases taken as a
References to the transcript of the hearings submitted by the Department to the
District Court indicated that in licensed establishments where "topless" and "bottom-
less" dancers, nude entertainers, and films displaying sexual acts were shown, numerous
incidents of legitimate concern to the Department had occurred. Customers were found
engaging in oral copulation with women entertainers; customers engaged in public mas-
turbation; and customers placed rolled currency either directly into the vagina of a fe-
male entertainer, or on the bar in order that she might pick it up herself. Numerous
other forms of contact between the mouths of male customers and the vaginal areas of
female performers were reported to have occurred.
Prostitution occurred in and around such licensed premises, and involved some of
the female dancers. Indecent exposure to young girls, attempted rape, rape itself, and
assaults on police officers took place on or immediately adjacent to such premises.
Id. at 111.
103. Id. at 118. The lower court found that the test set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968) was not met since the government purpose was not uprelated to suppression. 326
F. Supp. 348 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
104. 409 U.S. at 117.
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whole contribute to the overall assessment of the state authority
granted by that measure. Although the twenty-first amendment ex-
tended state power beyond some federal commerce clause restrictions,
that authority is limited in the face of more specific constitutional pro-
visions. After explaining the current limitations imposed on the
twenty-first amendment, it is now possible to consider a constitutional
challenge to a state proscription of liquor advertising. Only recently
has commercial speech been deemed worthy of limited first amend-
ment protection.10 5 The question now arises whether the improved sta-
tus of commercial speech will limit state police powers under the
twenty-first amendment which currently authorize Oklahoma's prohi-
bition of liquor advertising.
Any constitutional challenge to Article XXVII, section 5, clause 5
and title 37, section 516 of the Oklahoma Statutes should be based on
first amendment protection of commercial speech as applied to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The state would undoubtedly defend by strongly asserting its regula-
tory power under the twenty-first amendment. It would argue that La-
Rue controlled any first amendment challenge and subordinated
freedom of expression to state liquor regulations.106 Citing the early
cases featuring the "untrammelled power" of the states, a proponent of
the Oklahoma advertising ban could show how the fourteenth amend-
ment was virtually ignored by courts giving wide discretion to the wis-
dom of the individual states.
In addition, the state could be expected to argue that LaRue in-
volved admittedly protected expression yet was relegated to the police
powers of the twenty-first amendment. 107 Arguably, the motivation in
LaRue of curbing anti-social behavior compares favorably to
Oklahoma's interest in preventing undue stimulation of liquor con-
sumption. In addition, the state would urge that the statute should be
sustained since, under Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter,0 s
the state is to be accorded wide latitude in its choice of means to ac-
complish a permissible, if not favorable, end. 10 9 The decrease of liquor
consumption by preventing stimulation through extensive advertising
105. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976). See notes 124-43 infra and accompanying text.
106. The position of the state is generally anticipated by the author's reliance on 10 Okla. Op.
Att'y Gen. 225 (1977) which addressed the constitutional issue directly.
107. Id. at 227.
108. 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
109. Id. at 48.
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would be offered by the state as an acceptable means.110 The presump-
tion of validity accorded state liquor regulations, which Justice Rehn-
quist announced in LaRue,"' gives additional weight to the position
that all such regulatory measures are protected by the twenty-first
amendment from constitutional challenges.
Opponents of state prohibitions on liquor advertising would predi-
cate their rebuttal on federal limitations of state regulatory power in
this area. Police powers enhanced by the twenty-first amendment, on
which the state can be expected to rely heavily, are given a different
interpretation by a case of Oklahoma origin. Craig v. Boren clarifies
the effect of the fourteenth amendment in the face of state authority to
control liquor. That case recognizes the limited impact of the twenty-
first amendment: "Once passing beyond consideration of the Com-
merce Clause, the relevance of the Twenty-First Amendment to other
constitutional provisions becomes increasingly doubtful."1 12  Sus-
taining an equal protection claim to a liquor regulatory measure, the
Court emphasized that when individual rights were involved, state po-
lice powers have been sharply curtailed." 3 If the potency of the four-
teenth amendment has been upheld in protecting fundamental liberties,
surely the most hallowed of individual rights, freedom of speech, is
similarly sheltered from state infringement.
LaRue can easily be distinguished in light of Craig v. Boren, a
subsequent case. First, the ordinance in LaRue concerned the licensing
of liquor establishments serving liquor-by-the-drink, clearly a legiti-
mate state regulatory area. The Oklahoma provisions squarely address
only the proscription on liquor advertising, however, with no mention
of concerns more traditionally within the reach of the twenty-first
amendment such as licensing or taxation. Oklahoma's regulation is a
speech prohibition concerning alcohol while the California statute in-
volves a licensing ordinance which incidentally restricts expression.
This is more than a difference in semantics; it is the distinction between
what may be viewed as a valid time, place and manner restriction and
an invalid form of content-based restriction. Governmental disagree-
ment with the content of a message may not determine the time, place,
110. See note 157 infra. But see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 n.7 (1976).
111. 409 U.S. at 118-19.
112. 429 U.S. at 206.
113. See discussion supra note 97 and accompanying text. "Cases involving individual rights
protected by the Due Process Clause have been treated in sharp contrast." Id. at 207.
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and manner restrictions imposed on that speech." 4 However, a legiti-
mate governmental interest, apart from the suppression of speech, may
be the basis for imposing greater restrictions on speech due to its con-
tent.' 15 The Oklahoma proscription on liquor advertising goes beyond
"regulation" of protected speech, instead requiring the wholesale elimi-
nation of commercial liquor messages. In this way, the Oklahoma stat-
ute goes far beyond any twenty-first amendment power enjoyed by a
state in enacting liquor regulations such as that allowed in LaRue and
is not deserving of the protection of that amendment.
Second, the speech prohibited in Oklahoma is afforded an inter-
mediate level of first amendment protection." 6 The Court in LaRue
hinted at a sliding scale of speech protection for nearly-obscene forms
of expression by analogizing to expressive conduct decisions. " "But
as the mode of expression moves from the printed page to the commis-
sion of public acts that may themselves violate valid penal statutes, the
scope of permissible state regulations significantly increases."" 8 The
Oklahoma prohibition does not affect only marginal forms of speech, it
bans all commercial speech on a particular subject. It concerns no
form of expressive conduct bordering on obscene or even unprotected
behavior as in LaRue. Finally, in LaRue, Justice Rehnquist empha-
sized that nude performances were not forbidden across the board in
the state. Their proscription as to offensive conduct applied only to
114. Eg., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 64 (1976); Police Dept. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). Relying on policies of self-fulfillment and representative govern-
ment, the Court explained:
[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds accepta-
ble, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.
And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities.
There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and government must afford all
points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly
or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or
speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public
forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to
content alone.
Id.
115. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-48 (1978)
(Carlin's "seven dirty words" monologue was not obscene, yet FCC proscription of its radio
broadcast was not violative of the first amendment in light of heightened governmental interest in
the broadcast media and its possible effect on children); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976) (city's interest in the character of its neighborhoods justifies zoning
ordinances restricting the locations of adult movie theaters). See Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979
Term-Foreward" Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 44-46 (1980).
116. See notes 144-49 infra and accompanying text.
117. 409 U.S. at 117 (citing Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Giboney v. Empire
Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
118. 409 U.S. at 117.
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performances in licensed liquor-by-the-drink establishments, so addi-
tional forums for that type of expression remained. Oklahoma, on the
other hand, forbids all advertising of alcoholic beverages except for one
small sign alloted to each liquor retailer. This content-based restriction
does not comport with other decisions allowing speech regulation
where alternative forums remained.' 9 No substitute forum exists for
this stifled expression within the state since the statute reaches all in-
state media.
It would appear that LaRue can be distinguished on its facts to
defeat Oklahoma's ban on liquor advertising. However, the broader
implication in Craig v. Boren that significantly narrows the LaRue
grant of state authority is a preferable means of circumventing the ban.
Infringement on protected speech and other fundamental rights will
not be tolerated solely on the basis of enhanced state police powers
under the twenty-first amendment. In this light, the applicability of
LaRue beyond the facts posed is diminished when confronted with
challenges on the basis of individual rights. Under a federal constitu-
tional challenge, the validity of the applicable provisions of the
Oklahoma Constitution and Statutes would be questionable.
III. COMMERCIAL SPEECH
12 0
The constitutional guarantee of free speech does not include all
types of speech. Only those forms of expression which have been
deemed worthy of protection will be guarded from the intrusion of
state regulations sanctioned by the twenty-first amendment. 21 In other
words, the Oklahoma ban on advertising can be held unconstitutional
119. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (picketing near school in
session); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (courthouse demonstations); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949) (sound trucks).
120. Any attempt to define commercial speech is difficult, if not futile. It embodies far more
than speech which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction." Pittsburg Press Co. v.
Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). Neither is economic motive the sole
determiner of commercial speech. Both of these are factors but they are far from conclusive. The
indefinite quality of the word "commercial" is possibly excelled only by the breadth of the word
"speech."
121. Originally, the protected status of speech was determined by content. Fighting words,
libel, obscenity, and commerical speech warranted no first amendment protection while all other
forms of speech received full-scale protection. This two-tiered analysis was severely shaken after
a series of decisions changed earlier interpretations of those categories. See Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1975) (commercial speech);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (defamation); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New
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only if the advertisement involved is a protected form of commercial
speech. Until recently, such protection was not extended to most types
of commercial communications. This particular variety of speech was
deemed unworthy of the mandates of the first amendment solely be-
cause of its economic function. Contrasted against a judicial history of
nonprotection, commercial speech emerged in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. ,122 as deserving
of limited free speech protective measures, at least in certain instances.
In the years that followed that decision, the precise status of the protec-
tion afforded commercial speech seemed uncertain.1 23 In an attempt to
inject some specificity into this area, the philosophical justifications of-
fered as distinctions between commercial speech and the fully-pro-
tected variety will be examined and hypothetical advertising situations
will be reviewed.
A. Foundations for Separate Treatment of Commercial Speech
It has been stated that the fundamental "purpose of the first
amendment was to assure an effective system of freedom of expression
in a democratic society."' t2 4 An absolutist interpretation of the amend-
ment could reasonably find that protection from government interfer-
ence extended to commercial speech as well as to the more traditionally
guarded forms of expression. 2 Despite the guarantee of free speech,
commercial speech has been the stepchild of the Constitution solely
because of its economic implications. Justifications for this inferior sta-
tus based on content are familiar (if unconvincing):
122. 425 U.S. 748 (1975).
123. For thorough analysis, both historical and philosophical, of commercial speech decisions,
see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 767-80 (1978); L. TRIBE, AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-15 (1978); Baker, Commercial Speech: .4 Problem in the Theory
of Freedom, 62 IA. L. REV. I (1976); Farber, Commercial Speech and First 4mendment Theory, 74
Nw. U.L. REv. 372 (1979); Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 4
LAW FORUM 1080 (1976); Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L.
Rv. 1191 ( 1965); Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine and the FirstAmendment, 12 TULSA L.J.
699 (1977).
124. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 916
(1963). See generally Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1977); Jackson &
Jeffries, Commercial Speechk Economic Due Process and the FirstAmendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1, 6-
14 (1979).
125. But see Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 650 n.* (1951) (Black, J., dissenting)
(first amendment protection not extended to a " 'merchant' who goes from door to door 'selling
pots' ").
Mr. Justice Black is one of the most outspoken first amendment "literalists:' See Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring); Black, The Bill of Righis, 35 N.Y.U.L.
Rv. 865, 874 (1960).
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Commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the
market and of their products. They are well-situated to evalu-
ate the accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of the
underlying activity. In addition, commercial speech, the off-
spring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression
that is not particularly susceptible to being crushed by over-
broad regulation.
12 6
None of these propositions are irrefutable when comparing a
speaker encouraging the sale of his goods to a political speaker.' 27 In
fact they may apply equally to both forms of expression, yet one is
accorded the full protection of the Constitution while the other is not.
One commentator has observed:
To be sure, none of these generalizations is airtight; all of
them rest upon the obviously troublesome distinction that
plagued the Chrestensen doctrine-the distinction between
talk for profit, and talk for other purposes. But it is one thing
to make eligibility for first amendment protection turn on a
difficult line, and quite another to use the same line for the far
less momentous purpose of recognizing shades ofdference in
the application of settled principles. That there are and will
remain hard cases-is the coal company's ad proclaiming its
concern for environment and warning of the hazards of nu-
126. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980)
(quoting Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)); see Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976) ("advertising is the
sine qua non of commercial profits").
127. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW 772-73 (1978); Farber,
Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 372, 381-84, 392-93 (1979).
A politician is arguably as knowledgeable of his own record and future intentions once he is
elected as a seller of goods is of the tendencies of his products. The accuracy level of the two
statements is essentially the same, if not greater for the politician, yet the veracity of speech pro-
posing a commercial transaction is somehow to be more easily ascertained. Id. at 386. Admit-
tedly, not all examples of ideological speech are as simple, analytically, as the preceding one.
For instance, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the truth of any statement of opin-
ion concerning the best course of action to be taken by the government. But, by the same token,
by what criteria is the statement "this coffee has the richest flavor" to be judged? There seems to
be little reason to expect a prospective commercial speaker to be any less intimidated by an over-
broad statute than a political speaker. Farber states:
The existence of a chilling effect depends as much on the potential penalty as on the
motivation for the speech. A live dollar fine in a political speech case is probably less of
a deterrent than ajail sentence-or disbarment-in a commercial speech case. Advertis-
ers are not always large corporations which can view legal sanctions as a normal, almost
insurable, risk of doing business. Furthermore, powerful incentives of self-interest in
noncommercial speech are not uncommon. Salacious slander can sell newspapers; lies
can lead to lucrative political office. Quite apart from these rather unpleasant examples,
it is not at all clear that greed is more effective than idealism in motivating people to risk
government sanctions. One would at least hope that the contrary would be true.
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clear fuel commercial speech or political expression?-is an
insufficient reason either to return to the unprincipled extreme
of excluding all commercial speech from first amendment
protection, or to embrace the equally indefensible position
that government cannot stop someone from selling 7-Up
claiming it to be insulin.'28
The fact that one seeks to transmit a position concerning ideas and the
other economic matters seems little reason to deprive a citizen of infor-
mation in which his "interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than
his interest in the day's most urgent political debate." 12 9
The distinction between fully protected expression and partially
protected commercial speech is more accurately explained by reference
to theoretical considerations underpinning the first amendment: repre-
sentative government, market place of ideas, and individual autonomy.
These competing philosophies have been mentioned in several cases
and scholarly works expounding on freedom of speech theories.13 ° The
first consideration is whether the purpose of the first amendment is ori-
ented toward protecting representative government by free debate of
democratic philosophies toward a realization of the common good. It
has been stated that:
[I]t is definable as the perceptions of the majority to men,
and not otherwise. The social interest that the First Amend-
ment vindicates is rather. . . the interest in the successful op-
eration of the political process, so that the country may better
be able to adopt the course of action that conforms to the
wishes of the greatest number, whether or not it is wise or is
founded in truth.
Discussion, the exchange of views, the ventilation of
desires and demands-these are crucial to our politics. And
so, for much the same reasons, is the effectiveness of the deci-
sions reached by the political process. . . . It would follow,
then, that the First Amendment should protect and indeed en-
courage speech so long as it serves to make the political pro-
cess work, seeking to achieve objectives through the political
128. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 656 (1978) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
129. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 763 (1976).
130. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 113-18 (1977 Supp.);
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576-79 (1978); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial
Speeclk Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1, 6-14 (1979);
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 263.
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process by persuading a majority of voters; but not when it
amounts to an effort to supplant, disrupt, or coerce the process
• .. and also not when it constitutes a breach of an other-
wise valid law, a violation of majority decisions embodied in
law. 13'
Commercial speech and private sector topics of debate are not within
the protection of the first amendment if promoting representative gov-
ernment is the only purpose for free speech. If the value of speech is to
be measured by only this goal, then all forms of nonpolitical speech are
quite possibly beyond the reach of the first amendment. 2
Under a second theory, the marketplace of ideas is touted as ad-
vancing knowledge and promoting truth. This perspective is best ex-
plained by Justice Holmes' belief that "the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market."'' 33 This theory would assess more forms of speech as deserv-
ing of first amendment protections since the market would ultimately
determine their viability. 134 Any reliance on the market mechanism for
131. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 62-63 (1975) (emphasis in original); see A.
MEIKLEIOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 79, 95-96 (1960).
132. See P. BREST, supra note 130, at 115. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) in
upholding criminal anarchy statutes the Court expressed the sentiments of the representative gov-
ernment purpose: "[A] state may penalize utterances which openly advocate the overthrow of the
...United States ... by violence or other unlawful means. n short, this freedom [of speech]
does not deprive a State of the primary and essential right of self-preservation; which so long as
human governments endure, they cannot be denied." Id. at 668 (citations omitted).
Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65
VA. L. REv. 1 (1979) explains:
[Tihis rationale does not include "speech" irrelevant to the processes of political
decisionmaking, or so tenuously connected as to be no more useful in the formation and
reformation of political opinions than the experience of life itself. In other words, the
political speech rationale does not protect a ripht of individual expression for its own
sake but rather seeks to preserve the systemic integrity of our constitutional scheme of
self-government.
Id. at 11.
133. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
134. However, there are occasions where the market cannot be relied upon to fully regulate
speech. One such instance concerns fighting words. Where the expression is so outrageous that it
tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace, there is no time for the market mechanism to
neutralize the offensive speech. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); cf.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (defamation).
The Court's standard for prior restraint of expression similarly reflect heavy reliance on the
marketplace as the true regulator of speech. Only in exceptional cases are prior restraints of pro-
tected speech upheld by the Court and then only when disclosure would immediately threaten
national security. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per
curiam) (Pentagon Papers case); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). But see Donaldson
v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 189-91 (1948) (upholding prior restraints on commercial speech);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding narrowly drawn parade permit law); FTC
[Vol. 16:734
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speech regulation, however, introduces the bargaining power of indi-
vidual citizens. Unfortunately, bargaining power (ie. wealth) is not
evenly distributed throughout the population. Therefore, a "highly pa-
ternalistic approach" must be adopted by the government in order to
protect the less powerful from their own uninformed decisions unless
bargaining power itself is equalized.135 Certainly, this inequity has
been weighed strongly in favor of commercial speech to better inform
the disadvantaged.13
6
Finally, a third philosophy which influences interpretation of the
first amendment is the protection of individual autonomy. An outspo-
ken advocate of this theory explains: "[S]uppression of belief, opinion
and expression is an affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man's
essential nature."'' 37  Narrowly defined, this goes to the heart of free
trade in ideas, such as political and artistic speech.
The interest which the State wishes to protect here is identical
to that which the Court has previously held to be protected by
the First Amendment: the right to adhere to one's own beliefs
and to refuse to support the dissemination of the personal and
political views of others, regardless of how large a majority
they may compose. 31
However, the right of consumers to receive information is as worthy of
protection as the orator's right to expound since it is the self-fulfillment
of the individual which is the determinant of first amendment protec-
tion.'39 More expansively then, this theory protects the autonomy of an
individual to receive and formulate an opinion concerning the informa-
tion, political theory, artistic expression, or religious persuasion, as well
as the ability to express that view originally.
v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937) (commercial speech); E.F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235
F.2d 735, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969 (1957).
135. Mr. Justice Blackmun recognized the economic oppression of commercial speech re-
straints in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976). But see id. at 783-84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (economic theory of the Court
replacing legislative judgment).
136. Id. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Blackmun observed:
Those whom the suppression of prescription drug price information hits the hardest are
the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged. A disproportionate amount of their income
tends to be spent on prescription drugs; yet they are the least able to learn, by shopping
from pharmacist to pharmacist, where their scarce dollars are best spent.
Id. at 763.
137. Emerson, Towarda General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879 (1963).
138. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 815-16 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
139. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 757 (1976); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). But cf. Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (even though professors had a right to hear an alien speaker, Con-
gress' power to control aliens was superior).
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Many freedom of speech opinions openly weigh these competing
theories. 40 Other cases emphasize one philosophy without mention of
additional considerations.'41 The important point, however, is that the
outcome of a particular case can be determined by the theory of speech
utilized. Early cases following solely the representative government
theory could ignore commercial speech viability 142 while more recent
cases have recognized that form of expression by relying on market-
place or autonomy considerations. 143 An appreciation of the signifi-
cance of the purposes behind these three theories will assist in the
interpretation of the following decisions discussed in the commercial
speech area. Specifically, these competing philosophies should be con-
sidered in determining the inherent value of liquor advertising.
B. Analytical Frameworkfor Ascertaining First Amendment Status of
Hypothetical Liquor Advertisements
From the unsettled middle-tier constitutional status previously oc-
cupied, commercial speech finally emerged with clearly-defined first
amendment protection in 1980. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission, 44 the Supreme Court announced a four-
part test to determine whether government regulation of commercial
speech was forbidden by the first amendment. In order to receive first
amendment protection, a particular advertisement must satisfy all four
steps. In announcing this intermediate level of protection, the opinion
clearly distinguishes between the full measure of first amendment safe-
guards afforded the expression of ideas and the lesser degree given
commercial speech. First, the Court must examine the content of the
communication in deciding if it is within the protection of the Constitu-
tion. Those messages which are likely to deceive rather than inform, as
well as those concerning an illegal activity are outside the first amend-
140. See, eg., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
141. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (individual autonomy); Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (representative government).
142. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding a handbill prohibition when an
entrepreneur distributed material with commercial speech on the other side). But see Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (holding that a license tax for door-to-door sales was unconsti-
tutional as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses' sale of religious pamphlets).
143. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (invalidating an
ordinance prohibiting for sale real estate signs); Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (upholding a statute forbidding sexually discriminatory
help wanted ads).
144. 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (holding that a statute which banned advertisements promoting the
use of electricity by electric utilities was unconstitutional infringement on free speech despite legit-
imate government concern for the energy shortage).
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ment. Second, the state's interest must be deemed substantial and the
manner of regulation should be proportionate to the interest asserted.
Third, the substantial government interest must be directly advanced
by the regulation. Measures providing only tenuous support for the
state's purpose will not be sustained. Fourth, the speech restriction
must be narrowly drawn-if a more limited infringement on speech
would serve the state's interest as well, the regulation will not survive a
constitutional challenge. 1
45
Clearly, the Central Hudson decision did not answer all of the con-
stitutional questions plaguing the commercial speech area. The Court
was curiously silent concerning the qualities necessary for a substantial
state interest. It did, however, provide some guidelines for the resolu-
tion of some problems. For example, the overbreadth doctrine remains
inapplicable to commercial speech cases since, due to the greater dura-
bility, overbroad state regulations were less likely to chill that type of
expression. 146 Speculation, though, even if to a lesser degree, continues
in this comparatively new constitutional area as it has from Valen-
tine, 47 through Virginia Board of Pharmacy,48 up to the present.149
The following section will pose several hypothetical advertise-
ments within judicially distinguishable categories violating the
Oklahoma Constitution and Statute. Each hypothetical will then be
examined in light of the most recent line of Supreme Court cases inter-
preting the commercial speech doctrine.
1. Informational Speech
A retailer of liquor, complying with all state licensing require-
ments, pays the local newspaper to run a truthful advertise-
ment naming three national brands of alcoholic beverages
with corresponding sizes and prices, together with the location
of the store.
Clearly, this type of speech is protected. "The First Amendment's
concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function
of advertising."' 5 ° It is neither inaccurate nor deceptive. The admit-
145. Id. at 566.
146. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977) ("commercial well-being"); see
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565-66 & n.8 (1980);
Note, The First Amendment Operbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844, 852-58 (1970).
147. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
148. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
149. See note 121 supra.
150. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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tedly truthful information makes no misleading claims about the prod-
ucts offered for sale. The activity it concers-the sale of alcohol for
private consumption-is certainly not illegal,'-" although liquor as an
industry is highly regulated. The Court notes in Central Hudson that
the protection of the first amendment has been extended to the adver-
tising of several enterprises, which are subject to extensive state regula-
tion such as utility companies, optometrists, lawyers and
pharmacists. 152 However, if the retailer had not complied with such
state licensing requirements as would make the sale of liquor illegal,
then the speech would fall beyond first amendment protection. Cer-
tainly, the store owner is economically motivated. In placing the ad-
vertisement he is proposing a commercial transaction to purchase
liquor by stating the prices of various types and sizes. But the informa-
tional nature of this communication "furthers a societal interest in the
fullest possible dissemination of information."' 153 Consumers of that
product should be allowed to shop comparatively just as consumers of
prescription drugs and other products may. Economic motivation
alone will no longer disqualify the store owner from the protection of
the first amendment. 154 Additionally, even if the newspaper advertise-
ment might be considered tasteless by some portions of the populace, it
does not lose its status of protection:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes
may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to
who is producing and selling what product, for what reason,
and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly
free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in
large measure will be made through numerous private eco-
nomic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those
decisions, and the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.
To this end the free flow of commercial information is indis-
pensable. 155
Once the expression is deemed protectable, however, it must be
151. This comment assumes that the sales by the retail liquor stores are for private consump-
tion totally within the laws of the state. It does not address open saloon liquor sales or public
consumption. See OKLA. Co~sT. art. XXVII, § 4; OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 8 (Supp. 1 1980).
152. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 567 n.10
(1980).
153. Id. at 561-62, 567.
154. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976).
155. Id. at 765. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (public advertisement of abor-
tions available in a neighboring state); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70(1964) (advertisement exposing racially discriminatory practices by state officials).
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balanced against the remaining analytical stages concerning the state's
interest in suppression. In anticipating the purposes advanced for state
provisions, speculation is unavoidable.1 56 However, there are official
pronouncements concerning the state's motivation behind the liquor
advertising prohibition. In an early case challenging the constitutional-
ity of the provisions in question, the court noted that the state proposed
restricting the consumption of alcohol as the justification for the ban on
liquor advertising.15 7 The legislature appears to have advanced a simi-
lar purpose for the regulations as evidenced by a statute covering the
same topic:' "The Board may prohibit. . . the advertising of alco-
holic liquor in this state to prevent deception of the consumer, to pre-
vent the undue stimulation of the consumption of alcoholic liquor and
• ..prohibit all such advertising that is. . .offensive to morals and
good taste."15 9 Since the purposes cited in the case are essentially con-
tained in the statutory language, only those found in the statute will be
examined.
Searching for a substantial state interest which is proportionate to
the regulatory measure, the first state justification, to prevent deception,
can be discarded immediately. To prevent consumer deception is cer-
tainly a valid purpose;16 however, any issue concerning the tendency
to mislead is treated when determining the extent of first amendment
protection to that particular communication. The court will determine
at the outset (step one) whether the communication is "more likely to
deceive the public than inform it.' 61 If an advertisement is deter-
mined to be deceptive or misleading, the requirement of a substantial
156. Accord, United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 301 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("[I]t is a precarious business for an outsider to be confident about the legal policy of a
state").
157. State ex rel. West v. State Capitol Co., 24 Okla. 252, 103 P. 1021, 1023 (1909):
It is common knowledge that it is the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage that is
deemed harmful, and is the mischief sought to be prevented by the legislation. The
prohibition of the sale and keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors is only a means. The
end sought for is the prevention, or at least the diminution, of the drinking of intoxicat-
ing liquors by the people of the state... Read in connection with the other legislation,
its evident purpose is to further the ulterior purpose of all that legislation, viz., to dimin-
ish the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage.
Id.
158. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 516 (1971).
159. Id. The general purposes of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act are set out in id. at§ 503: "This Act shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the State of Oklahoma for the
protection of the welfare, health, peace, temperance and safety of the people of the State, and all
the provisions hereof shall be construed for the accomplishment of that purpose."
160. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1979); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 & n.24 (1976).
161. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
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government interest is not applicable since the message is not within
constitutional protections.1 62
Concerning the state's second purpose, to prevent the undue stim-
ulation of liquor consumption by prohibiting all liquor advertising,
Justice Blackmun comments:
I seriously doubt whether suppression of information con-
cerning the availability and price of a legally offered product
is ever a permissible way for the State to "dampen" demand
for or use of the product. Even though "commercial" speech
is involved, such a regulatory measure strikes at the heart of
the First Amendment. This is because it is a covert attempt
by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens, not by
persuasion or direct regulation, but by depriving the public of
the information to make a free choice.16 3
In reality then, this particular form of choice manipulation attempts to
alter the market to achieve morally desirable results rather than al-
lowing the marketplace of ideas to operate freely and responsible indi-
viduals to make such decisions for themselves.
This type of paternalistic approach has been abandoned where the
government prevents the dissemination of information needed to make
a free choice solely on the grounds that unfortunate consequences may
result from those public choices. "It is precisely this kind of choice,
between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its
misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for
us. ' ' 64 By dictating what information the citizens of Oklahoma may
receive, the legislature has interfered with the consumer's right to re-
ceive advertising16 5 as well as the ability to make an informed deci-
sion.' 66 Both of these involve an affront to individual integrity and
autonomy. Such a sweeping method used to advance the state's sub-
stantial interest in this case is not direct enough to sustain it from a first
amendment challenge. A more acceptable measure might be the impo-
162. Id.
163. Id. at 574-75 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
164. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
165. Id. at 757; cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (defendants held in custody must
be informed of certain constitutional rights before a knowing waiver can be given). But see Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 782 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (right to receive information is not at issue since consumers may call or
visit the pharmacy for price quotations, rather it is the right of non-party pharmacists to publish
the prices).
166. See 425 U.S. at 765.
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sition of a high tax on all retail liquor sales or a restriction on available
liquor supplies. Since the paternalistic justification for the state regula-
tion failed under the third phase of the Central Hudson test in that it
did not directly advance the asserted state interests, it is unnecessary to
address the fourth criterion, its viability as a narrowly drawn restric-
tion.
The final justification advanced by the state for prohibiting adver-
tising is that it offends morals and good taste. It is doubtful whether
good taste could seriously be asserted today as a legitimate state inter-
est. Granted, morals are important to a state. However, that justifica-
tion could be advanced for any number of morally oriented
regulations, many of which would violate the citizen's fundamental
rights to privacy and association. 167 Due to the vagueness of any mo-
rality/good taste interest, it is doubtful that it would be deemed a sub-
stantial state interest which was directly advanced by the statute and
therefore cannot justify the wholesale suppression of certain types of
commercial speech.168
2. Deceptive-Misleading Speech
The same liquor retailer purchases advertising space in the
local newspaper reading, "Help relieve that nagging winter
cold-HOT TODDY SPECIAL" then goes on to list brand
names, sizes and prices of the ingredients needed to make a
hot toddy. The advertisement includes the address of the re-
tail establishment.
The protected status of this particular advertisement depends
solely on its tendency to deceive the public. The medicinal value of a
hot toddy is certainly often-touted though not technically proven.
However, it is accommodation for deception, not actual truth, which
affects commercial speech particularly. False speech has never been
accorded the protection of the first amendment regardless of its com-
mercial aspect. 169 In Virginia Board of Pharmacy the court explained:
Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or
even wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading. We fore-
167. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (marital use of contraceptives).
168. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 765 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); see discussion supra note 155 and ac-
companying text.
169. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S.
36, 49 & n.10 (1961).
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see no obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with this prob-
lem. The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not
prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commer-
cial information flow cleanly as well as freely. 1 70
The language of the particular advertisement in question should be
helpful in uncovering the potential for public deception. Use of the
words "help relieve" would seem to be readily distinguishable from an
ad proclaiming "HOT TODDIES CURE COLDS EFFECTIVELY."
The latter seems to be a definitive quality statement as well as one
which seems to assure the reader of scientific proof which, unless sub-
stantiated, may deprive that slogan of first amendment protection. The
original example, however, appears to be sufficiently indefinite as to
leave only a general impression in the minds of the public. It is more in
the nature of an opinion that hot toddies relieve cold symptoms rather
than an empirical statement of fact. The Supreme Court has declared:
"Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction
not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of
other ideas."'171 Considering the informational content of the remain-
der of the advertisement, the hot toddy phrase seems less likely to
deceive the public than inform it. Nor does it concern an unlawful
activity. Hence the advertisement is guarded by the first amendment
from unwarranted state regulation.' 72
The governmental interests asserted to defend a first amendment
challenge to the Oklahoma liquor advertising ban would more than
likely be the same under this example as under the informational
speech challenge. Specifically, the state would seek to avoid consumer
deception and undue stimulation of liquor consumption as well as ad-
vancing morality and good taste. These interests were incapable of de-
feating fully protected informational speech. For the same reasons,
those purposes are not sufficient to infringe on protected speech such as
the hot toddy advertisement.
It should be recognized that according to the marketplace theory
170. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771-72 (1976).
171. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
172. Commercial speech messages appear to be treated separately according to content. Val-
entine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (even though one side of a leaflet contained political
statements while the other advertised a commercial exhibition, it was deemed unprotected as com-
mercial speech). For example, if a handbill was five-sixths informational and the other sixth de-
ceptive, the entire handbill would be unprotected. But cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(in determining whether a work is obscene, it must be examined as a whole).
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of speech protection, even deceptive advertisements would probably be
entitled to first amendment safeguards. The market mechanism could
be expected to flush out the deception in such a statement rather than
relying on government censorship.' 73 Prohibiting deceptive speech
does not follow individual autonomy either, since the personal evalua-
tion of the citizen is not the determining factor in its acceptance. It
would appear, then, that the Court's decision to withhold first amend-
ment protection from commercial speech which is more likely to
deceive than inform is not primarily founded on either of these philoso-
phies.
3. Trade Name
The liquor retailer placed an advertisement containing either
the informational or the possibly deceptive speech as set out
in the two previous examples. To this advertisement however,
he added the words "Joe's Liquor Store" as a trade name.
Treatment of trade names in the area of commercial speech follows
closely the principles governing deception. In the only recent commer-
cial speech case to consider trade names, the Court stated:
[It is] a form of commercial speech that has no intrinsic mean-
ing. A Trade Name conveys no information about the price
and nature of the services offered. . . until it acquires mean-
ing over a period of time by associations formed in the minds
of the public between the name and some standard of price or
quality. 174
In that case, the Court upheld a Texas statute forbidding optometrists
to utilize trade names, explaining that the possibilities for manipulation
of the quality-trade name association were too great. 175
Friedman is easily distinguished from the case at hand since the
liquor retailer sells products, usually nationally marketed brands,
rather than services. The quality difference between the sale of Brand
X whiskey at Joe's and the sale of that same Brand X whiskey at an-
other retailer is not bound up with every product he sells in the mind of
the consumer, since every other retailer markets substantially the same
items. Since these are prepackaged by the manufacturer, individual re-
tailers have little influence over the differences between shipments
173. But Gf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (defamation); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964) (defamation).
174. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12 (1979).
175. Id. at 12, 13.
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which are passed on to the customer. Granted, there might be certain
aspects of a particular retail outlet which distinguish it from all
others-the marketing of house brands of liquor or specializing in rare
wines, for instance. The association between the trade name and this
particular specialty might even become quite well-developed. If that
retailer were to retain the trade name, yet discontinue the special prac-
tice, the consumer would still not be unduly burdened by the associa-
tion-he would merely find another liquor store which provided the
additional service. Certainly, the clients of an optometrist, operating
under a trade name, are much more adversely affected when they re-
turn to the office of the same trade name and meet with greatly dimin-
ished quality after a change in personnel.1 76
Since trade names in the liquor retailing business are not deceptive
or illegal, they, too, should be afforded the protections of the first
amendment. The interests of the state could be expected to be the same
as those offered in the preceding examples. As a result, the state regu-
lation could not withstand a first amendment challenge since it does
not directly or permissibly advance the state interest.
4. Promotional speech
Suppose that Joe's Liquor Store places an advertisement with
a locally published and distributed magazine. The full page
spread contains a picture of a glamorous couple drinking
from champagne glasses. The only printing states: "To the
Good Life-Drink More Champagne, Joe's Liquor Store."
This advertisement obviously has minimal informational value-it
functions solely to encourage a particular course of action by the
reader, the promotion 77 of liquor consumption. But the bare eco-
nomic motives of the advertisement alone will not deprive this type of
commercial speech of constitutional safeguards. 178 Indeed, Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting in Virginia Pharmacy, argued that, under the ma-
jority opinion, promotional advertising similar to the champagne ex-
ample would be totally unrestricted if not untruthful or misleading. 179
However, a later case warned that promotional advertising may be sub-
176. Id. at 13, 16.
177. For the purposes of this discussion, advertising will be deemed promotional if it is "in-
tended to stimulate the purchase of" liquor. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 559 (1980).
178. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976).
179. Id. at 788-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting):
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ject to "some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer
or the like."' 0
Determining the protection given this message, it must be ex-
amined for its possible deceptive effect on the public as well as any
illegal practice it might concern. Nothing indicates that illegality might
be involved. As for deception, the effect might be to form a loose asso-
ciation between champagne and a prosperous future in the mind of the
public. But it is hard to predict that more than a few readers would be
so gullible as to believe that drinking champagne results in one acquir-
ing the personal and financial well-being generally associated with "the
good life". Therefore, there does not seem to be a "significant possibil-
ity"'' that the slogan will mislead the general public. Since the
message is neither deceptive nor pertaining to an illegal activity by the
standards of Central Hudson, it is deserving of first amendment com-
mercial speech protection.
Although the same state interests will probably be asserted to de-
fend the constitutionality of the regulation, the outcome differs signifi-
cantly in the absence of any informational content. The state's interest
in undue stimulation of alcohol consumption takes on a new meaning
when no information which could assist the consumer in his choice is
suppressed by the regulations. No longer would the advertising pro-
scription manipulate the choices of its citizens through information
Unless the State can show that these advertisements are either actually untruthful or
misleading, it presumably is not free to restrict in any way commercial efforts on the part
of those who profit from the sale of prescription drugs to put them in the widest possible
circulation. . . The very real dangers that general advertising for such drugs might
create in terms of encouraging, even though not sanctioning, illicit use of them by indi-
viduals for whom they have not been prescribed, or by generating patient pressure upon
physicians to prescribe them, are simply not dealt with in the Court's opinion. If pre-
scription drugs may be advertised, they may be advertised on television during family
viewing time ...
Both Congress and state legislatures have by law sharply limited the permissible
dissemination of information about some commodities. . . even though they were not
thought to be sufficiently demonstrably harmful to warrant outright prohibition of their
sale. Current prohibitions on television advertising ofliquor and cigarettes are prominent in
this category, but apparently under the Court's holding so long as the advertisements are not
deceptive they may no longer be prohibited
Id. (emphasis added).
180. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (invalidating a total state ban on
attorney advertising); see, e.g., J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967) (manufac-
turers of "Geritol" must explain that iron deficiencies are only one possible reason for tiredness);
15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976) (surgeon general's warning on cigarettes). See generally Jackson & Jef-
fries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1, 3-4
(1979).
181. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
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availability. 82 In refusing to allow promotional advertising, the state is
not promoting its own goal by "keeping the public in ignorance."'18 3
Instead, it could be viewed as removing unnecessary liquor stimulation
from the channels of communication. Hence, the state interest gains
credibility with a change in the nature of the advertisement.
In addressing whether the restriction directly advances state inter-
ests, it is difficult to assume the existence of specific behavioral correla-
tions. Certainly the state would be required to produce evidence that
the prohibition on advertising provides more than tenuous support in
furthering the state's aim to curb liquor consumption. Assuming that
such a correlation could be proven, the burden is still on the state to
show that its interest could not be served by a more limited restriction.
It is in this category that a prohibition on all liquor advertising must be
defeated. Even if promotional speech of this nature should be regu-
lated, a total ban on all advertising is certainly an excessive measure
since a far more limited restriction could be equally effective in pro-
moting the purpose of the state. A warning of the hazardous effects of
alcohol on the printed page of the advertisement or a narrowly drawn
ban on only certain types of promotional advertising'8 4 could serve the
state equally well without the harsh consequences of total prohibition.
In this way, the regulatory technique would extend only so far as the
interest promoted and first amendment considerations would be ob-
served.
5. Political Speech
Joe's Liquor Store purchases advertising space in the local
newspaper again. The message reads, "Support the Liquor
Industry-vote for liquor by the drink. Joe's Liquor Store."
Even though this advertisement has some incidental promotional
aspects, it clearly expresses a position on a current political controversy.
It does more than "simply propose a commercial transaction" as does
purely commercial speech.' 85 Instead it involves the free discussion of
a controversial government policy---"the heart of the First Amend-
182. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 578 (1980);
Linmark Assoc., Inc., v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977).
183. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
184. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
But see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 570-71 (1980).
185. The definition of commercial speech is not so definite as some cases would imply. See
note 120 supra and accompanying text.
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ment's protection."' 6 The restriction of liquor retail advertising can-
not be justified on the basis that liquor retailers are not entitled to
publish opinions on political issues which affect that particular indus-
try. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he inherent worth of
the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not
depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, associa-
tion, union or individual."'t 87 This advertisement is then entitled to the
full protection of political speech, not just the intermediate level of
scrutiny afforded commercial speech.
Since the Oklahoma advertisement restricts fully protected speech,
it may not be sustained unless it is (1) a reasonable time, place or man-
ner restriction, (2) a permissible subject-matter regulation, or (3) a
narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state interest.' 8  In
addressing the validity of time, place and manner restrictions, the court
has maintained that they must be "applicable to all speech irrespective
of content."'189 The state does not suppress the views of those other
than liquor retailers on this particular subject. In this way, the ban on
liquor advertising is not constitutionally justified on the basis of subject
matter or time, place and manner restrictions.19 0
The compelling government interests advanced by the advertising
ban would presumably be the same justifications offered above. These
were not substantial enough in those cases to justify the broad imple-
186. First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
187. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980) (quoting First
National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 n.5 (1980):
[To] accord full First Amendment protection to all promotional advertising that
includes claims "relating to ... questions frequently discussed and debated by our polit-
ical leaders". . . . would blur further the line the Court has sought to draw in commer-
cial speech cases. It would grant broad constitutional protection to any advertising that
links a product to a current public debate.
Id. (citation omitted); see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
188. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
189. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1975). The Court explained:
[W]hen the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public
from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the
First Amendment strictly limits its power. Such selective restrictions have been upheld
only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home, or the degree of captivity
makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. As Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan cautioned: "The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to
shut off disclosure solely to protect others from hearing it is. . . dependent upon a show-
ing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable man-
ner. Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to silence
dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections."
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
190. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).
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mentation measure adopted by the state. For the same reasons, the
interests will not withstand the higher level of judicial scrutiny for pro-
tected speech-they are not narrowly drawn, compelling state interests.
For this reason, the Oklahoma alcohol advertising prohibition cannot
be sustained in the face of a constitutional challenge based on fully
protected speech.
6. Different Mediums
Joe now begins an advertising campaign primarily using his
champagne advertisement ("To the Good Life-Drink More
Champagne, Joe's Liquor Store") on billboards, television
and radio stations throughout the area.
Many times the Court has recognized the "validity of time, place,
or manner regulations that serve a significant governmental interest
and leave ample alternative channels for communication."'' 91 Of
course, the state statute in this case does not leave any alternative chan-
nels available so it cannot be regarded as valid in that respect. How-
ever, if the statutory proscription were limited solely to outdoor and
electronic broadcast advertising of alcoholic beverages, entirely differ-
ent problems are presented.' 92
The advertisements are all assumed to be protected forms of com-
mercial speech-that is, truthful, not deceptive or misleading and not
regarding an illegal activity. Rather than the content of the advertise-
ments, it is the particular characteristics of these omnipresent media
which might enhance the state's interest in regulation.193
The protection of children from constant exposure to the promo-
tion of liquor consumption could certainly be considered a substantial
state interest. 194 Adults may "effectively avoid further bombardment
191. Id.; e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, (1976).
192. A state statutory ban would operate to forbid only television advertisements for wine and
strong beer. A professional regulation currently prevents the national broadcasting of commer-
cials for intoxicating beverages other than wine and beer. The NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
BROADCASTERS TELEVISION CODE, Advertising Standards, Sec. IV, reads: "7A. The advertising
of hard liquor (distilled spirits) is not acceptable. 7B. The advertising of beer and wine is accepta-
ble only when presented in the best of good taste and distinction, and is acceptable only subject to
federal and local laws."
193. See discussion supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text. It is doubtful that these inter-
ests would gain in validity with the change in forms of media. However, different treatment for
electronic broadcasts does occur, see note 195 infra, so that the state's interest in preventing the
undue stimulation of alcoholic consumption, for instance, may receive more favorable judicial
interpretation.
194. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (dictum); f. Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968) (state allowed to prohibit distribution of sexually explicit materials to minors).
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of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes."' 9 5 Children, how-
ever, would be unable to escape either medium in such a manner sim-
ply because they would not know to do so. Arguably, a child's
ingestion of subliminal messages delivered in promotional advertise-
ments begins long before development of the capacity to classify infor-
mation as acceptable or not. It is these children then, whom the state
has a particular interest in protecting, as they are far less able to protect
themselves, more of a captive audience to the conscious and subcon-
scious effects of promotional liquor advertising. 196
The regulation must directly advance the asserted governmental
interest. In upholding the constitutionality of prohibiting cigarette ad-
vertising on radio and television' 97 the Court found "[s]ubstantial evi-
dence showed that the most persuasive advertising was being
conducted on radio and television, and that these broadcasts were par-
ticularly effective in reaching a very large audience of young peo-
ple."' 198 Although statistical studies would be required to correlate
liquor advertising and children's attitudes toward that commodity, it
seems credible to assume that such studies would produce results simi-
lar to the statistics concerning cigarette advertising. Billboards also
seem to sufficiently put the message "in the air" to directly influence
children. Even though a written message is included, reading that
message is not essential to communicate the meaning. A picture of a
happy, prosperous couple drinking from funny-shaped glasses can
communicate as favorable an impression to a youngster as a spoken
message from a radio.199 Speculation on such an important matter,
however, is insufficient. Studies would be necessary to confirm the ad-
195. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). For explanation of differences between print
and electronic media, compare Miami Herald Publishing Co v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(holding an equal access statute unconstitutional for political candidates' replies in newspapers)
with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding right to reply regulations
for television broadcasts).
196. Cf. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (upheld statute where
public transit commercial advertising was allowed although political advertising was not, on
grounds that riders would be "captive"). But cf. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1977) (George Carlin's 'Seven Dirty Words' radio broadcast essentially
holds an audience captive).
197. Capital Broadcasting v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), af'dmem sub nor.
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney-General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
198. Id. at 585-86.
199. Contra, Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
842 (1969); Capital Broadcasting v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 586 (D.D.C. 1971), aftdmem sub
nom. Capital Broadcasting Co v. Acting Attorney-General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
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verse effects of radio, television and billboard advertising before a
Court will uphold such a regulatory measure.
Finally, the regulation must be so narrowly drawn that it is no
more extensive than necessary to further the state's interest. It is in this
area that a total ban on television and radio might be invalidated.
Complete proscription of even outdoor and electronic media assumes
that children watch television and listen to a radio twenty-four hours a
day. While this may be true in certain instances, a narrower ban on
liquor advertising during the day and through prime time broadcasts
would eliminate most of the exposure to youngsters while still allowing
a comparable adult forum for the commercials. The same might be
true of billboard advertisements not containing pictures. The regula-
tion can go only so far as is reasonable to protect children from liquor
promotion. Informational advertisements might reasonably be allowed
in all media since it does not have the promotional aspect of the com-
mercial in question. Whatever measure is eventually adopted, it is
clear that invalidating the present provisions of the Oklahoma Consti-
tution and Statutes as violating the first amendment does not necessar-
ily mean all state interests in liquor advertising must go unrestricted.
Less intrusive measures are available to accomplish state purposes.
It seems appropriate to note that the Supreme Court has not yet
ruled on the relationship between commercial speech and electronic
broadcasting since an intermediate level of protection has been given
that variety of communication. Commentators have asserted that the
ban on cigarette advertising would not be sustained under the present
level of scrutiny.-"° Arguably, there seem to be few substantial reasons
for any distinction between print and electronic media concerning com-
mercial speech. If so, then outdoor, radio and television liquor adver-
tisements would be constitutionally equated with court decisions
affecting the print media.
200. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 778 (1978); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 652-53 (1978):
[Aln advertisement proposing an unlawful transaction may be forbidden on the theory
that the harm threatened is within the government's power to prevent-and that more
speech cannot be expected to avert it .... So long as inflicting the injury is something
that government has not attempted to make unlawful, however, such a rationale is un-
available. Thus decisions suggesting that government mayforbid the advertising of harnnful
commodities while leaving people free to purchase them f they wish plainly go beyond the
theory suggested here.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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7. Cable Television
Joe's Liquor Store now decides to air his promotional com-
mercial only on the local cable television station.
An Oklahoma Attorney General opinion addressed precisely this
point in early 1980.20! Equating this private broadcast with regularly
broadcast television, the Attorney General concluded: "There is no
reason to believe that cable television should be treated any differently
than regular broadcast television."202 The opinion did leave room for
modification of the rules by noting that "distinctions between cable tel-
evision and regularly broadcast television, if any, are issues of fact not
properly addressed by an Attorney General's Opinion."20 3
In Cablecom-General, Inc. v. Crisp, 2° Oklahoma cable compa-
nies sought to enjoin the director of the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board from enforcing the Oklahoma ban on liquor advertising against
those entities. Without this injunction, cable companies are forbidden
by federal statute from deleting or altering the signal transmitted,20 5
while they are required by state law to intercept all nationally broad-
cast alcohol commercials. Besides raising the liquor advertising issue,
this case raises serious federalism and supremacy clause questions as
well as challenges on the factual distinctions between cable and broad-
cast television.20 6 In order to avoid the consequences of this "Catch-
22" situation, Oklahoma cable television operators may be forced to
cease carrying all distant independent signals, the sine qua non of their
telecasts. This drastic solution will in itself violate federal law which
requires the transmission of certain signals in some instances.20 7
Although cable television is a comparatively new entity and the
subject of little case law at present, the differences seem great between
it and regularly scheduled television. Conventional television is trans-
mitted through limited public airwaves and is received by anyone with
a television set. A cable television signal on the other hand, is sub-
scribed to by individual television owners from private broadcasting
companies. Thus, cable reception is much more of a private decision
201. Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. (79-334) (1980).
202. Id. at 3.
203. Id. "The prohibition of advertising alcoholic beverages via regulatory broadcast televi-
sion applies similarly to advertising by cable television companies." Id. at 4-5.
204. Civ. No. 81-290 (W.D. Okla., filed Mar. 3, 1981).
205. 47 C.F.R. § 76.55(b) (1980).
206. A preliminary injunction has been issued to prevent enforcement of the state advertising
proscription while the case awaits trial.
207. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57(a), 76.59(a) (1980).
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by the individual. The superiority of the privacy of the home 20 8 and
the individual's right to receive such advertisements20 9 make a differ-
ence between permissible government regulation of regularly sched-
uled broadcasts and that allowed for cable television.210  This
particular form of broadcast seems to present a far more difficult con-
stitutional issue against government restriction than conventional tele-
vision.
208. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state may not infringe on the privacy
of individual by forbidding dispensation of contraceptive devices); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969) (unconstitutional to prohibit the possession of obscene material for private use in the
home).
209. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 757 (1976) (commercial speech). But see United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass'n, 49 U.S.L.W. 4813 (1981) (statute prohibiting placing unstamped notices in approved
mailboxes does not violate first amendment rights of associations seeking distribution); United
States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (no right to distribute obscene literature to a private individ-
ual).
210. When one compares the factual situation involved in the cable television industry's at-
tempting to block out commercials with factual records of local subsidiaries of national networks,
one finds the two to be very diflerent indeed. The cable operators are not normally importing
network signals. They offer independent stations who have no reason to cooperate in providing
the needed notices of upcoming liquor advertisements. Broadcast television is not legally prohib-
ited from deleting signals, as is cable television. Where over-the-air television is dealing with only
one incoming signal, cable television operates with upwards of forty-five signals at one time.
In 1972, the Federal Communications Commission issued the "Cable Television Report and
Order." Cable Television Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg. 3252 (1972). The report dealt with a
proposal to allow cable operators to delete the distant signal commercials and substitute local
advertisements. The National Association of Broadcasters "judged the commercial substitution
proposal to be confisicatory, technically, and economically unworkable, and inconsistent with the
realities of the marketplace." Id. at 3256.
A further factual characteristic that distinguishes cable television from the broadcast media is
the passive nature of the cablecasting as opposed to the active broadcasting of television and
radio. In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968), the copyright holder
of several motion pictures alleged copyright infringement against a cable television company,
when it carried the signal of those broadcast stations granted rights to broadcast the movies. The
Court held the cable system did not "perform" the copyrighted works. Id. at 395. In drawing a
line between broadcasting and viewing, the Court held the cable company fell within the viewing
area. Specifically, it was stated that:
Essentially a CATV system no more than enhances the viewer's capacity to receive the
broadcaster's signal; it provides a well-located antenna with an efficient connection to the
viewer's television set. It is true that a CATV system plays an "active" role in making
reception possible in a given area, but so do ordinary television sets and antennas.
Id. at 399 (footnotes omitted). The Court continued:
The function of CATV systems has little in common with the function of broadcasters.
CATV systems do not in fact broadcast or rebroadcast. Broadcasters select the programs
to be viewed, CATV systems simply carry, without editing, whatever programs they re-
ceive. Broadcasters procure programs and propogate them to the public; CATV systems
receive programs that have been released to the public and carry them by private chan-
nels to additional viewers. We hold that CATV operators like viewers and unlike broad-
casters, do not perform the programs that they receive and carry.
Id. at 400-01 (footnotes omitted).
45
Long: The Constitutionality of Oklahoma's Prohibition on Liquor Adverti
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1980
OKLAHOMA LIQUOR ADVERTISING
IV. CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, Oklahoma's liquor industry is highly regulated.
The twenty-first amendment authorizes extensive state involvement in
all phases of alcoholic beverage distribution under section two. Al-
though broadly sweeping language is contained in that provision, it was
not intended to repeal the Bill of Rights in all transactions concerning
liquor. Instead, the application of state powers under the twenty-first
amendment is appropriately confined to situations more immediately
concerned with the transportation or importation of alcoholic bever-
ages. The interest of the state in controlling liquor does not outweigh
the individual's right to protected speech under the first amendment.
Despite the expansive wording in early commerce clause cases and
later language in Calfornia v. LaRue,"' federal constitutional safe-
guards do not immediately fade in importance in the face of state li-
quor regulations. Especially solicitous in the area of individual rights,
the Supreme Court is particularly unwilling to uphold overly invasive
state authority over intoxicating beverages.
Commercial speech, such as advertising, has been given an inter-
mediate level of first amendment protection. To be upheld, a regula-
tion on protected speech would have to directly advance a substantial
governmental interest and be no more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.2" 2 Oklahoma's statutory proscription is a broad,
sweeping measure which is vaguely related to dubious governmental
interests. It provides no alternative forum for any type of alcohol com-
mercials. Hence, it appears that the Oklahoma statutory and constitu-
tional provisions would be held unconstitutional as applied to most
types of liquor advertisements.
Theoretical considerations of free speech would seem to favor this
result. With warnings possibly placed on liquor advertisements, the
marketplace of ideas can freely be allowed to regulate discourse con-
cerning alcohol. Similarly, increased advertising would function to
equalize the bargaining power of those evaluating the information and
purchasing the commodity. By furthering the considerations of indi-
vidual autonomy, the personal integrity of those desiring to advertise as
well as those receiving the advertisements will be more appropriately
observed. Oklahoma citizens may be trusted to decide for themselves
their desire for retail liquor purchases rather than having consumption
211. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
212. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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levels indirectly manipulated by state regulation of the free flow of in-
formation to consumers.
V. POSTSCRIPT
Since the final revision of this comment, three United States
Supreme Court cases have been decided which affect the arguments
contained herein. In New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca,21 3
night club owners challenged on first amendment grounds a statute
prohibiting topless or nude dancing in establishments selling liquor by
the drink. Reversing the state court holding that the statute was uncon-
stitutional, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that the
first amendment protection afforded these live performances was not
sufficient to outweigh state interests in liquor control under the twenty-
first amendment. The Court stated that, "the State's power to ban the
sale of alcoholic beverages entirely includes the lesser power to ban the
sale of liquor on premises where topless dancing occurs."21 4 Justice
Stevens' dissent properly chastised the majority for expanding the La-
Rue balancing test beyond its logical limits without explicit proof of a
substantial governmental interest, arguing that the twenty-first amend-
ment did not offer wholesale state power to invade all first amendment
rights in establishments where liquor is served. Justice Stevens inti-
mated the reasoning used in the majority opinion could accommodate
the state prohibition of expression of current political controversies in
bars serving liquor.215 Although Bellanca can be broadly interpreted to
conform with Justice Stevens' warning, it may also be narrowly con-
strued to merely expand the LaRue holding to include less offensive
forms of expression. The opinion contains fairly broad language inter-
preting the twenty-first amendment, but the LaRue balancing test
seems to be maintained in reaching the holding.
In a plurality opinion, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego ,216
the Court held that a municipal prohibition on billboards, the content
of which did not fall within certain prescribed exceptions, was invalid
on its face on first amendment grounds. The ordinance prohibited all
noncommercial speech and certain commercial speech messages which
did not advertise "on-site" sales or services. The opinion stressed that
213. 101 S. Ct. 2599 (1981) (per curiam).
214. Id. at 2601.
215. Id. at 2604.
216. 49 U.S.L.W. 4925 (1981).
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not only does commercial speech receive different treatment than non-
commercial speech, but that particular forms of commercial speech
may themselves be entitled to different standards-their own law.217
Applying the Central Hudson21 1 test for commercial speech restrictions,
Mr. Justice White stated that the ban was not invalid merely because it
distinguished between "on-site" and "off-site" commercial speech.
However, the plurality found that the exclusion of noncommercial
messages, when some types of commercial speech are allowed, was a
violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. Concurring in the
judgment, Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Blackmun, con-
cluded that San Diego's ordinance did not meet first amendment re-
quirements with respect to both commercial and noncommercial
aspects. Specifically, the concurring opinion remarked that the plural-
ity's indication that the Constitution sanctioned a total ban on bill-
board commercial speech so long as noncommercial speech remained
uninhibited is erroneous. Such a distinction would give city officials
the ability to determine the commercial status of the advertisement.
This distinction is not as clearcut as one would imagine, as Mr. Justice
Brennan demonstrated with examples not dissimilar to those examined
in the previous textual discussion.2"9 The Metromedia decision, and
the five supporting opinions, must be closely examined in order to ac-
curately address the CentralHudson test for commercial speech protec-
tion and the distinctions between treatment for commercial and
noncommercial speech.
In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,22 ° the Court addressed a
first amendment challenge to a zoning ordinance which excluded all
live entertainment throughout the borough. The operators of an adult
bookstore which offered coin-operated viewing of nonobscene, live,
nude dancing was fined for violation of a zoning ordinance which ex-
cluded all live entertainment. The Court overturned their convictions.
Distinguishing Schad from Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. ,22
the Court found the need for additional parking, police protection, and
medical facilities an insufficiently compelling reason to ban live en-
tertainment.222 The Court's holding in Schad narrows the effect of
217. Id. at 4928.
218. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
219. Notes 150-210 supra and accompanying text.
220. 101 S. Ct. 2176 (1981).
221. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
222. 101 S. Ct. at 2184-86.
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Young so that government infringement on first amendment rights in
furtherance of zoning powers is justified only upon an actual showing
that the municipal threat outweighs the established interests in protect-
ing nonobscene expression. Schad does not reverse the well-estab-
lished trend of weighing nearly-obscene or offensive expression
differently from more protected forms of expression.
.Joann E. Long
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